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CRIMINAL LAW—WHEN THE PILLOW TALKS: ARKANSAS’S RAPE SHIELD 
STATUTE BARS DNA EVIDENCE EXCLUDING THE DEFENDANT AS THE 
SOURCE OF SEMEN. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The jury is empaneled, seated numerically in its box. You are juror 
number eight, second row, second from the left. From testimony, you and 
your fellow jurors know that the victim was allegedly raped on her bed. The 
victim and eyewitness originally described the rapist as being 5’5” with 
blonde hair. After the media displayed the defendant’s driver’s license in-
formation, the victim and eyewitness changed their description of the rapist 
to being 6’0” with black hair. 
The state calls an expert witness on DNA evidence. The expert testifies 
that it is not unusual for DNA evidence to be absent from a rape crime sce-
ne. The defense attorney asks whether the defendant’s DNA was found at 
the crime scene, and the expert answers, “No.” In your mind, the implication 
is that there is no DNA evidence at the crime scene and that is not unusual. 
Would the fact that semen was present on the victim’s bedsheet and 
pillowcase make the question of whether the defendant was misidentified 
more or less probable in your mind? Suppose the state’s expert witness testi-
fied that semen was present on the victim’s bedsheets and pillowcase, where 
the rape occurred, and asserts that the semen did not match the defendant. 
The defense points out that the state filed a motion to compel the de-
fendant’s DNA sample to compare the DNA from the bed sheets and pillow 
case. Weeks before trial, the state filed two motions to exclude two state 
crime lab reports that conclusively exclude the defendant as the source of 
semen found on the victim’s bed sheets and pillow case. Would you be more 
or less likely to believe that the defendant was misidentified? 
Part II of this note provides background on rape shield laws, concen-
trating on the tight line courts have to walk between protecting a rape vic-
tim’s prior sexual history and the defendant’s constitutional rights to con-
front witnesses and to present a defense.1 Part III discusses the facts, proce-
dural history, and the Arkansas Supreme Court’s analysis in Thacker v. 
State.2 This note argues that the Arkansas Supreme Court was wrong in 
Thacker3 and posits that the Arkansas Supreme Court should have held that 
the probative value of DNA evidence in the form of another person’s semen 
 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. See infra Part III; 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65. 
 3. See infra Part III; 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65. 
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on the victim’s bedsheets and pillowcase outweighed any inflammatory or 
prejudicial nature and that the trial court’s failure to admit that evidence 
constituted clear error or abuse of discretion.4 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section begins by discussing the relevant history behind the en-
actment of rape shield statutes designed to protect victims of sex crimes 
from having their sexual past become the focus of trial.5 Next, this section 
analyzes the conflict that has developed between excluding evidence based 
on social policy justifications and protecting the defendant’s constitutional 
rights to present a defense and to confront the witnesses against him.6 This 
section also dissects each Supreme Court of the United States opinion on 
this issue and discusses the framework that lower courts must use to balance 
the social policy behind rape shield statutes with protecting the accused’s 
constitutional rights.7 This section then reviews the highest state-court deci-
sions applying that framework to the issue of whether rape shield statutes 
that bar DNA evidence excluding the defendant as the source of semen vio-
late that defendant’s constitutional rights.8 Finally, this section concludes 
that Arkansas’s rape shield statute is facially constitutional because it com-
ports with the framework set forth by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.9 
A. All United States Jurisdictions Have Enacted Rape Shield Statutes 
Based Upon Social Policy Justifications 
Traditionally, a rape victim’s sexual behavior was relevant and admis-
sible in a rape prosecution.10 Prior to the adoption of rape shield statutes, 
American courts admitted evidence showing the alleged victim’s sexual 
 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See infra Part II.D. 
 10. See, e.g., Edward Imwinkelried, Sex Crimes and Offenses in an Era of Reform, 
Should Rape Shield Laws Bar Proof that the Alleged Victim Has Made Similar, False Rape 
Accusations in the Past? Fair Symmetry with the Rape Sword Laws, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 709 
(2016); Ya’ara Barnoon & Elena Sytcheva, Rape, Sexual Assault and Evidentiary Matters, 13 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 459, 460, n.7 (2012); Shawn J. Wallach, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Pro-
tecting the Victim at the Expense of the Defendant’s Constitutional Rights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 485, 487 (1997); David S. Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional 
Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1976) (explaining that the common law rule 
favored admission of the alleged rape victim’s past sexual history). 
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promiscuity because it was generally accepted that a promiscuous person 
was likely to be untruthful.11 Societal mores at the time considered sexual 
promiscuity immoral, calling into question the individual’s character.12 
In response to criticism by a “well-publicized anti-rape movement,” 
states began to change the common-law rule that permitted the introduction 
of evidence of the victim’s sexual history by adopting some form of a rape 
shield statute.13 One justification that proponents of rape shield legislation 
advanced to restrict the admission of evidence of the alleged victim’s sexual 
behavior was that rape victims were deterred from reporting sexually-
charged crimes to avoid prosecutions that turned into an investigation of the 
victim’s past sexual conduct.14 All United States jurisdictions accepted that 
argument as a justification in favor of adopting rape shield statutes.15 
A woman’s willingness to engage in sexual activities with one person 
tells the jury nothing about her willingness to consent to sexual activities 
with another partner.16 It is easy to defend the operation of rape shield stat-
utes to exclude evidence that has little or no relevance to the case, such as 
when the accused argues that the evidence shows the alleged victim is mere-
 
 11. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 713–14; Michelle J. Anderson, From 
Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 69 (2002). 
 12. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 713–14. 
 13. Anderson, supra note 10, at 54. The traditional rule that allowed such evidence was 
criticized by an anti-rape movement, which suggested that the rule unnecessarily subjected 
rape victims to public embarrassment and discouraged the reporting of rape incidents. See 
Rudstein, supra note 10, at 9 (stating “the ordeal faced by the [alleged victim] often was so 
harrowing that it seemed as if the alleged victim were on trial. Many critics of the traditional 
rules of evidence have suggested this traumatic experience is one of the reasons rape is such 
an under-reported crime.”). 
 14. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 713 (adding that “[a]nother justification is that given 
modern sexual mores, the evidence has minimal probative value and, more specifically, sheds 
little light on the question of whether the alleged victim consented to intercourse with the 
accused.”); Wallach, supra note 10, at 489. 
 15. Rape Shield Statutes, NAT’L DISTRICT ATTY’S ASS’N, NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION 
OF CHILD ABUSE (2011), http://ndaa.org/pdf/NCPCA%20Rape%20Shield%202011.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2018) (compiling statutes for all fifty United States jurisdictions and the 
federal statute); see also Barnoon & Sytcheva, supra note 10, at 460 n.7 (quoting People v. 
Summers, 818 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). 
 
The underlying policy of rape-shield statutes are to prevent the defendant from 
harassing and humiliating the complaining witness with evidence of either her 
reputation for chastity or specific acts of sexual conduct with persons other than 
the defendant, since such evidence has no bearing on whether she consented to 
sexual relations with the defendant. 
 
Id. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 713. 
 16. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 713. 
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ly promiscuous.17 Today, almost everyone would reject that argument as 
“antiquated and sexist.”18 
There are situations where the decision of whether or not to apply a 
rape shield statute is difficult. Sometimes the proffered evidence is relevant 
to the facts of consequence in the case.19 In a rape case where the victim and 
the accused are strangers and the victim and an eyewitness gave prior incon-
sistent statements while describing the rapist, DNA evidence is relevant and 
crucial to the case because the source of semen could either potentially in-
culpate or exonerate the accused.20 In these situations, it is more difficult to 
dismiss the defense evidence as immaterial and inconsequential.21 Any time 
there is an exclusionary rule blocking the accused’s ability to introduce crit-
ical, demonstrably reliable evidence, the accused’s constitutional rights are 
at stake.22 
B. Courts Balance Social Policy Justifications for Rape Shield Statutes 
with a Defendant’s Constitutional Rights 
Commentators recognize that by restricting the admissibility of rele-
vant evidence,23 rape shield statutes collide with the accused’s constitutional 
right to present a defense.24 The vast majority of courts have excluded evi-
dence of the victim’s venereal diseases, prostitution, molestation, and gen-
eral past sexual predisposition.25 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Pamela Lakes Wood, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 335, 345 (1973) (commenting that most judges do not admit consent or chasti-
ty history as proof of character for truthfulness); see Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 714. 
 19. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 714. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. The exclusion of evidence under rape shield laws certainly does not offend the Con-
stitution when such evidence is irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771 
(8th Cir. 2009) (deciding that, in a prosecution for sex trafficking of a minor, the exclusion of 
evidence pertaining to the alleged victim’s sexual behavior and other acts of prostitution did 
not violate the defendant’s due process rights because the disputed evidence was not relevant 
to any element of the crime charged). 
 24. E.g., Regan Kreitzer La Testa, Rape Shield Statutes and the Admissibility of Evi-
dence Tending to Show a Motive to Fabricate, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 489 (1999); Frank 
Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 1245 
(1989); Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977). 
 25. Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of “Rape Shield” Statute Restricting 
Use of Evidence of Victim’s Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R. 4th 283 (1980) (collecting the 
cases); see, e.g., United States v. Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d 1017, 1029 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(evidence of another molestation); United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 2015) (evi-
dence of victim’s involvement in prostitution); Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 
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1. United States Supreme Court Decisions on the Constitutionality of 
State Rape Shield Statutes 
The Supreme Court of the United States has decided two cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state rape shield statutes, Michigan v. Lucas26 
and Olden v. Kentucky.27 In Lucas, the Court held that a state rape shield law 
was unconstitutional as applied because it adopted a per se rule prohibiting 
the admission of a victim’s prior sexual conduct when the defendant failed 
to follow strict procedural requirements.28 The Court recognized that states 
may enforce procedural requirements based on legitimate state interests, 
which may justify exclusion of the accused’s proffered evidence.29 
In Olden, the Court held that judicial discretion to impose reasonable 
limits on the probative value of the defense evidence must bend its knee to 
the defendant’s constitutional rights.30 The Court has not answered the sub-
stantive question of where the line is drawn between protecting the alleged 
victim from disclosure of the victim’s sexual history and the defendant’s 
constitutional rights to present a defense and to confront the evidence and 
witnesses against him.31 
a.  The Supreme Court of the United States did not address the 
key constitutional question of whether procedural require-
ments curtail the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to con-
front when it decided Michigan v. Lucas 
In Michigan v. Lucas, the government charged the defendant with 
criminal sexual conduct after his ex-girlfriend alleged that he used a knife to 
force her into his apartment to engage in non-consensual sex acts.32 Michi-
gan’s rape shield statute permits a defendant to introduce evidence of the 
 
1982) (evidence of victim’s venereal disease); Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656, 659 (6th Cir. 
1982) (excluding general request to inquire of the alleged victim about “what men she has 
gone out with and how long she has gone with them”); Dunlap v. Hepp, 436 F.3d 739, 745 
(7th Cir. 2006) (evidence of child victim’s sexual knowledge prior to the incident); Hammer 
v. Karlen, 342 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2003) (excluding evidence that children touched each other 
sexually prior to alleged child molestation incident); Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. 1137 
(N.D. Ind. 1991) (hearsay testimony that rape victim had a reputation of liking sexual inter-
course “doggy fashion”); People v. Blackburn, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976) (victim’s alleged 
virginity and sexual predisposition). 
 26. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991). 
 27. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). 
 28. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 153. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). 
 31. See Lara English Simmons, Note, Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to Define the State 
Interest in Rape Shield Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1592 (1992). 
 32. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 147. 
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defendant’s own sexual conduct with the victim, provided he files a written 
motion, he submits an offer of proof within ten days of arraignment, and the 
trial court holds an in-camera hearing to determine whether the evidence is 
admissible.33 Lucas did not file a written motion or an offer of proof, as re-
quired by the statute.34 At trial, Lucas’s counsel requested that the trial court 
permit the defense to present evidence of a prior sexual relationship between 
the girlfriend and Lucas.35 
The trial court denied the motion due to the defendant’s failure to com-
ply with the statute’s procedural requirements.36 The Court considered the 
constitutionality of the policy behind rape shield statutes that prescribe spe-
cial notice and hearing requirements for evidence of the victim’s sexual his-
tory.37 The Court noted that the statute did not prescribe the consequences of 
a defendant’s failure to follow the notice requirements.38 The trial judge 
construed the statute as authorizing the exclusion of evidence as a sanction 
for the accused’s failure to comply with statutory notice and hearing re-
quirements.39 The Michigan Court of Appeals adopted a per se rule prohibit-
ing the inclusion of evidence of a prior sexual relationship between a rape 
victim and a criminal defendant.40 
While the Court recognized that probative evidence may be precluded 
in certain circumstances when a criminal defendant fails to comply with a 
valid procedural rule, it held that a per se rule barring admission of the vic-
tim’s prior sexual conduct is unconstitutional.41 The Court cited its rulings in 
United States v. Nobles42 and Taylor v. Illinois,43 pointing to circumstances 
where the defense evidence was probative but appropriately excluded be-
cause the defendant failed to comply with a valid discovery rule.44 
In Nobles,45 the defense hired an investigator who interviewed prosecu-
tion witnesses prior to trial.46 The defendant relied on the investigator’s writ-
ten report to cross-examine prosecution witnesses for impeachment purpos-
es.47 When the defense called the investigator, the District Court ruled that, 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 145. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 151, 153. 
 41. Id. 
 42. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). 
 43. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
 44. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151–52. 
 45. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). 
 46. Id. at 227. 
 47. Id. 
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at the end of the impeachment testimony, a copy of the report would have to 
be submitted to the prosecution.48 Defense counsel stated that he did not 
intend to produce the report, and the District Court ruled that the investiga-
tor would not be permitted to testify about his interviews with the witness-
es.49 The Court upheld the District Court’s ruling because the judiciary’s 
compulsory processes may require the production of evidence necessary for 
“‘full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evi-
dence.’”50 
The Court also held that failure to comply with procedural require-
ments or a court order, may warrant preclusion as a “proper method of as-
suring compliance with its order.”51 The Court rejected the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment claim, explaining that “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer 
the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adver-
sarial system.”52 
The Court pointed out that the defendant was not deprived of his right 
to compulsory process or cross-examination because the District Court did 
not bar the investigator’s testimony.53 The District Court merely prevented 
the defendant from presenting to the jury “a partial view of the credibility 
issue by adducing the investigator’s testimony,” while at the same time re-
fusing to disclose the report.54 The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment 
does not confer the right to present testimony free from the demands of an 
adversarial system and cannot be invoked for presenting a half-truth.55 
In Taylor, the trial court sanctioned a defendant for “willful miscon-
duct” that was designed to obtain “a tactical advantage” based on his viola-
tion of a state procedural rule.56 The defendant failed to identify a defense 
witness in pretrial discovery, and the trial court refused to allow the witness 
to testify.57 The Court rejected the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim that 
“preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation.”58 The 
Court acknowledged that “alternative sanctions would be adequate and ap-
propriate in most cases” but explained that there are some circumstances 
where preclusion is justified because a less severe penalty “would perpetu-
ate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 230–231 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)). 
 51. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241. 
 52. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416–417 (1988). 
 57. Id. at 415. 
 58. Id. at 414 (emphasis in original). 
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process.”59 The Court held that “regardless of whether prejudice to the pros-
ecution could have been avoided” by a lesser penalty, “the severest sanction 
was appropriate” because the defendant’s actions were egregious.60 
The Court extended its analyses in Nobles and Taylor to Lucas.61 In 
Lucas, the Supreme Court held that these procedural requirements serve 
legitimate state interests of protecting the victim against surprise, harass-
ment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy, which also protect the prosecu-
tion from surprise.62 The Court also held that these interests might justify 
exclusion of the accused’s proffered evidence in appropriate cases.63 
The Court did not decide whether Michigan’s statute authorized the 
remedy of preclusion or whether such a remedy would violate the accused’s 
Sixth Amendment rights.64 Lucas’s significance is limited because it only 
establishes the principal of law that procedural statutory requirements serve 
legitimate state interests in protecting the victim, which can justify exclusion 
of the accused’s proffered evidence in appropriate cases.65 Lucas does not 
explicitly state which types of evidence may be appropriately excluded, and 
it does not answer the key constitutional question of where the line is drawn 
between protecting the alleged victim from disclosure of the victim’s sexual 
history and the defendant’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to 
confront the evidence and witnesses against him.66 Nobles may serve as a 
guide for determining which types of evidence are likely to be excluded for 
failure to follow procedural requirements, such as the preclusion of evidence 
that only permits a partial view or half-truth to the jury on a credibility is-
sue.67 
 
 59. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 
400, 413 (1988)). 
 60. Id. at 152. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. On remand, the Michigan court held that under certain circumstances, the state’s 
statute permits preclusion of evidence of the defendant’s past sexual conduct with the victim 
for failure to comply with statutory notice and hearings requirements. People v. Lucas, 193 
Mich. App. 298, 484 N.W.2d 685 (1992); see also Simmons, supra note 31, at 1616–22 
(criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to describe the nature of the state’s purpose in pro-
tecting complaining witnesses, a crucial factor in determining the proper balance between 
goals of rape shield laws and rights of accused). 
 65. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152. 
 66. See Simmons, supra note 31, at 1616–22. 
 67. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975). 
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b. Olden v. Kentucky guides trial courts on how to find a bal-
ance between the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights 
and the justification behind state rape shield statutes 
The Court provided some clarity in Olden v. Kentucky, where it was 
confronted with the question of whether the trial court erred when it refused 
to permit the accused to cross-examine the complaining witness regarding 
her cohabitation with her boyfriend.68 In Olden, the defense claimed that the 
alleged victim fabricated the alleged sexual assault in order to protect herself 
from her live-in boyfriend discovering that she cheated on him.69 The trial 
court judge prohibited questions designed to reveal to jurors the existence of 
a live-in relationship, based on the judge’s concern that Kentucky jurors 
would be prejudiced against the white complaining witness if they learned 
that her live-in boyfriend was black.70 The trial court prohibited defense 
counsel from cross-examining the witness about her living arrangements 
even after she lied on the witness stand by stating on direct examination that 
she was living with her mother.71 
On appeal, Olden asserted that the trial court’s refusal to allow him to 
impeach the complaining witness’s testimony by introducing evidence sup-
porting a motive to lie deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to con-
front witnesses against him.72 The Kentucky Court of Appeals explicitly 
agreed with Olden that the fact that the complaining witness was living with 
her boyfriend at the time of trial was not barred by Kentucky’s rape shield 
statute.73 In spite of that finding, it held that the evidence was properly ex-
cluded because “‘its probative value [was] outweighed by its possibility for 
prejudice.’”74 
The Supreme Court, acknowledging that the evidence was relevant to 
Olden’s theory of defense and citing its holding in Davis v. Alaska, held that 
“[s]peculation as to the effect of jurors’ racial biases cannot justify exclusion 
of cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of 
[the defendant’s proffered] testimony.”75 The Olden Court held that the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires the defendant to be able 
to expose to the jury facts which may challenge the reliability of a witness.76 
 
 68. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 230–32. 
 71. Id. at 230. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145). 
 74. Olden, 488 U.S. at 230 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. A6). 
 75. Id. at 231. 
 76. Id. at 232–33 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–17 (1974); Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)). 
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The Court held that the Kentucky Court of Appeals failed to accord 
proper weight to Olden’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him,” which has been incorporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and is available in state proceedings.77 The Court noted that 
Olden’s right to be confronted with witnesses against him includes the right 
to conduct reasonable cross-examination.78 Reasonable cross-examination 
includes the right to impeach, subject to “the broad discretion of the trial 
court judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation.”79 
The Court noted that a reasonable jury might have received a signifi-
cantly different impression of the witness’s credibility concerning whether 
the complaining witness had a motive to lie had defense counsel been per-
mitted to pursue his proposed line of questioning on cohabitation.80 Judicial 
discretion to impose reasonable limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the 
potential bias of a prosecution witness, and to take account of factors such 
as “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or 
interrogation that [would be] repetitive or only marginally relevant,”81 must 
bow its knee to the defendant’s constitutional rights.82 
The Court noted its holding in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, that “the con-
stitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a wit-
ness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to . . . harm-
less error analysis.”83 The factors that courts must consider when reviewing 
for harmless error include: 
the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, 
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evi-
dence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on ma-
terial points, the extent of cross examination otherwise permitted, and, of 
course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.84 
The Court held that the complaining witness’s testimony was central 
and crucial to the prosecution’s case; thus, the Court held that it was impos-
sible to conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the restriction on Old-
en’s right to confrontation was harmless.85 
 
 77. Id. at 231 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
 78. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)). 
 79. Id. (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316) (explaining that “expos[ing] . . . ‘a witness’ 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the [defendant’s] constitutional-
ly protected right of cross-examination.”). 
 80. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)). 
 81. Id. (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 232–33 (internal citations omitted). 
 84. Id. (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680). 
 85. Id. 
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c.  There is no bright-line rule post-Lucas and Olden 
The Court decided Lucas86 on procedural grounds and not on the sub-
stantive question of where the line is drawn between protecting the victim 
from divulging sensitive information concerning her sexual history and the 
defendant’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to confront wit-
nesses against him.87 Lucas establishes that procedural requirements serve 
legitimate state interests that can justify the exclusion of defense evidence in 
appropriate cases, which is a proposition of law that the defendant did not 
challenge.88 Lucas is limited in that it does not establish which types of cases 
or which evidence may be appropriately excluded and failed to answer the 
constitutional question of where the line is drawn between protecting the 
alleged victim from disclosure of the victim’s sexual history and the defend-
ant’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to confront the evidence 
and witnesses against him.89 Olden extends the Van Arsdall factor test to 
cases where the defendant’s constitutional confrontation rights are pitted 
against the state’s rape shield statute.90 Olden requires courts to conduct the 
Van Arsdall factor test91 to determine when courts unconstitutionally in-
fringe on a defendant’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to con-
front witnesses by excluding defense evidence pursuant to a rape shield stat-
ute.92 
C. The Majority of States Hold that Exclusion of DNA Evidence Exclud-
ing the Defendant as the Source of Semen Is Unconstitutional 
Many states have held that a trial court abuses its discretion in violation 
of the defendant’s constitutional rights when it excludes evidence of another 
person’s semen found on the victim’s clothing.93 The highest courts in Flori-
da,94 Michigan,95 and West Virginia96 have been confronted with the issue of 
whether to admit evidence of another person’s semen pursuant to their re-
 
 86. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 149 (“Lucas does not deny that legitimate state interests support the notice-
and-hearing requirement.”). 
 89. See supra Part II.B.1(a). 
 90. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. State v. Timothy C., 787 S.E.2d 888, 897–900 (W. Va. 2016); People v. Command, 
No. 259296, 2006 WL 1237093, *2–5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); Teemer v. State, 615 So.2d 
234, 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 94. Teemer, 615 So.2d at 236. 
 95. Command, 2006 WL 1237093 at *2. 
 96. Timothy C., 787 S.E.2d at 898. 
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spective rape shield statutes. Each state reversed and remanded the trial 
court’s failure to admit the evidence as a violation of the defendant’s consti-
tutional rights to present a defense and to confront the evidence against him. 
1. The Florida Supreme Court Held its Rape Shield Statute Uncon-
stitutional as Applied for Barring Evidence of Another Person’s 
Semen Found in the Victim’s Rape Kit 
In Teemer, the victim reported that she was penetrated anally and that 
the rapist ejaculated;97 however, the rape kit revealed no evidence of trauma 
or semen in the victim’s anal cavity, but semen was removed from the vic-
tim’s vagina and cervix.98 The state sought an order to compel the defend-
ant’s DNA sample, which was granted.99 
After receiving the results from the state crime lab excluding the de-
fendant as the source of semen, the state sought to exclude the results of the 
DNA test.100 The state argued the DNA test results were irrelevant because 
the victim reported that she was penetrated anally.101 It further argued that 
any semen found in her vaginal cavity or cervix was not probative of the 
identity of her attacker, but was only probative of her prior sexual con-
duct.102 The defense argued that it was not seeking to admit the evidence to 
delve into victim’s prior sexual conduct;103 rather, the DNA test results ex-
cluding the defendant as the source of semen were crucial to its defense of 
misidentification.104 
The Florida Supreme Court aptly noted that if Florida’s rape shield 
statute precludes a defendant from presenting a full and fair defense, then 
“the statute would have to give way to these constitutional rights.”105 The 
court accepted the defense’s argument that the DNA test results were rele-
vant to the defense of misidentification, even though the victim reported that 
she had been penetrated anally and that the perpetrator ejaculated.106 The 
court held that the trial court’s exclusion of the DNA test result was an un-
 
 97. Teemer, 615 So.2d at 235. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 235. 
 103. Teemer, 615 So.2d at 235. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 236 (quoting Roberts v. State, 510 So.2d 885, 892 (Fla. 1987) (citing Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943 (1988)); Lewis v. State, 
591 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1991)). 
 106. Id. at 236. 
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constitutional limitation on the defendant’s ability to present a full and fair 
defense.107 The court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.108 
2. The Michigan Supreme Court Held its Rape Shield Statute Uncon-
stitutional as Applied when it Barred Evidence of Another Per-
son’s Semen on the Victim’s Underwear 
In People v. Command,109 the defendant argued that the trial court im-
properly excluded evidence that semen from someone other than the de-
fendant was found in the complainant’s underwear only fourteen hours after 
the alleged assault.110 The Court of Appeals noted that prohibiting a defend-
ant from questioning a victim encourages the reporting and prosecution of 
sexual offenses and protects legitimate expectations of privacy;111 however, 
the arbitrary application of the state’s rape shield statute may interfere with 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against 
him112 because “[t]he extent that [the rape shield statute] operates to prevent 
a criminal defendant from presenting relevant evidence, the defendant’s 
ability to confront adverse witnesses and present a defense is diminished.”113 
The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s right to due process of 
law is implicated by application of a rule that would exclude relevant, ex-
culpatory evidence.114 The Court of Appeals stated that, “[d]efendants have a 
due process right to obtain evidence in the possession of the prosecutor if it 
is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.”115 The 
Court of Appeals reasoned that it would be an abuse of discretion to exclude 
potentially exculpatory evidence on the basis of the Michigan’s rape shield 
statute because a defendant has a constitutional right to present exculpatory 
evidence.116 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in 
applying the rape shield statute to exclude exculpatory DNA evidence be-
cause the evidence was relevant to whether someone other than the defend-
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. People v. Command, No. 259296, 2006 WL 1237093, *2–*5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), 
rev’d on other grounds, People v. Command, 722 N.W.2d 427 (Mich. 2006) (reversing only 
portion of the Court of Appeals judgment that precluded on retrial evidence that the defend-
ant previously committed a non-consensual sexual penetration of a prior complainant). 
 110. Id. at *2. 
 111. Id. (citing People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 1982)). 
 112. Id. at *5 (citing People v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1996)). 
 113. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991)). 
 114. Id. at *4 (citing People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 662–680 (Mich. 1994)). 
 115. Command, 2006 WL 1237093 at *11 (quoting Stanaway, 446 Mich. at 662–680, 
citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). 
 116. Id. at *11–*12 (citing People v. Barrera, 547 N.W.2d 280 (Mich. 1996)). 
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ant was responsible for the victim’s injuries, and the court reversed and re-
manded the case for a new trial.117 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court 
reversed only the portion of the Court of Appeals decision excluding evi-
dence of the defendant’s prior bad acts.118 The Michigan Supreme Court 
upheld the Court of Appeals decision holding the state’s rape shield statute 
unconstitutional as applied.119 
3. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Held its Rape 
Shield Statute Unconstitutional as Applied when it Barred Evi-
dence of Another Person’s Semen on the Victim’s Shirt 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remand-
ed a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of another person’s semen on 
the alleged victim’s shirt.120 The state filed two motions to compel the de-
fendant’s DNA sample, noting that the presence of semen was consistent 
with the alleged victim’s statement that the defendant made her perform oral 
sex on him.121 The trial court granted the motion.122 
After receiving the test results excluding the defendant as the source of 
semen, the state filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the evidence as 
being irrelevant, overly prejudicial, and violative of the state’s rape shield 
law.123 In response, the defendant “maintained [that] the absence of his DNA 
was relevant to support his defense of innocence; was crucial to his defense; 
was potentially exculpatory evidence; and was crucial to his receipt of a fair 
trial.”124 The trial court excluded the DNA test result pursuant to the state’s 
rape shield statute.125 
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that, because the defendant’s 
defense was his innocence, identity-related information was critical to his 
defense and fell outside the purpose of the state’s rape shield law.126 The 
court stated that “the [defendant’s] purpose . . . does not thwart the goal of 
[the state’s rape shield statute], which ‘aims to safeguard the alleged victim 
against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment, and sexual stereo-
typing that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and 
the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding (sic) process.”127 The 
 
 117. Id. at *8–*10. 
 118. People v. Command, 722 N.W.2d 427, 428 (Mich. 2006). 
 119. Id. 
 120. State v. Timothy C., 787 S.E.2d 888, 892 (W.Va. 2016). 
 121. Id. 
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 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Timothy C., 787 S.E.2d at 898. 
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court held that excluding evidence of another person’s semen on the alleged 
victim’s shirt violated the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.128 
D.  Arkansas’s Rape Shield Statute Is Facially Constitutional because it 
Permits Defendants to Admit Relevant and Probative Evidence of the 
Alleged Victim’s Prior Sexual Conduct 
The purpose of Arkansas’s rape shield statute is to protect victims of 
rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, 
unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and public when 
the conduct is irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt.129 Under Arkansas’s rape 
shield statute, evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct is not admissible 
by the defendant to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent or 
any other defense, or to assert any other reason.130 
Arkansas’s rape shield statute grants an exception where the circuit 
court, at an in camera hearing, makes a written determination that such evi-
dence is relevant to a fact at issue and that its probative value outweighs its 
inflammatory or prejudicial nature.131 The statute is not a complete bar to 
evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct, but rather makes admissibility 
discretionary with the circuit court pursuant to procedures set out in the stat-
ute.132 That being said, the Arkansas Supreme Court treats the introduction 
of prior sexual conduct to attack the credibility of the victim unfavorably.133 
Circuit courts are vested with wide discretion in deciding whether evidence 
is relevant and admissible, and the Arkansas Supreme Court will not over-
turn a decision without “clear error or manifest abuse of discretion.”134 
III. ARGUMENT 
The facts and procedural history of Thacker contribute to the result 
reached by the Arkansas Supreme Court. At trial, Thacker sought to admit 
evidence of another person’s semen on the victim’s bedsheets and pillow-
case, where the alleged rape occurred, to support his defense of misidentifi-
 
 128. Id. at 899. 
 129. Stewart v. State, 2012 Ark. 349 at *5, 423 S.W.3d 69, 72. 
 130. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101(b) (2017). 
 131. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101(c) (2017). 
 132. Id. 
 133. State v. Kendall, 2012 Ark. 262, at *5, 428 S.W.3d 486, 489–90. 
 134. Allen v. State, 374 Ark. 309, 313, 287 S.W.3d 579, 582 (2008) (holding that “[Ar-
kansas appellate] court[s] will not reverse the circuit court’s decision as to the admissibility 
of rape-shield evidence unless its ruling constituted clear error or a manifest abuse of discre-
tion.”). But see Robert Steinbuch & Esther Seitz, Unscrambling the Confusion: Applying the 
Correct Standard of Review for Rape-Shield Evidentiary Rulings, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
281, 289 (2010) (arguing that the “clear error or abuse of discretion” standard does not exist). 
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cation.135 The trial court determined that another person’s semen on the vic-
tim’s bedsheets and pillowcase was protected by the rape shield statute and 
excluded the evidence.136 
The Arkansas Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion in Thacker, 
which is not entitled to precedential weight.137 The plurality opinion held 
that (1) semen stains belonging to someone other than the defendant are not 
probative; (2) at best, the semen stains show that the victim had sex prior to 
the rape, which is a clear violation of the rape shield statute and the purpose 
for which it exists; and (3) the prejudicial effect of embarrassing and humil-
iating the victim is high and outweighs the slight probative value of the evi-
dence.138 
This section argues that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s plurality opin-
ion misconstrues the trial record to arrive at its conclusion, that the concur-
ring opinion’s procedural concerns are misguided, and that the dissenting 
opinion reached the correct conclusion but failed to conduct the constitu-
tional analysis required by Lucas,139 Olden,140 and Van Arsdall.141 
A.  A Combination of the Facts and Procedural History of Thacker v. State 
Contributed to the Court’s Divided Analysis 
1.  The Statement of Facts in Thacker v. State Are Gripping 
In 2012, Crystal Hilborn woke up to a man’s hands gripping her neck 
and choking her,142 hissing “yeah, you bitch. Yeah, you fucking bitch.”143 
Hilborn tried to fight off the rapist, but was restrained.144 The man told Hil-
born that he “need[ed] [her] to get [him] hard.”145 He “started to masturbate 
and he told [her] to turn around and bend over on top of the bed.”146 Hilborn 
 
 135. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65. 
 136. Id. at *5-*6, 474 S.W.3d at 68. 
 137. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (an affirmance by an equally divided Court 
is not entitled to precedential weight)); accord Jones v. State, 83 Ark. App. 186, 119 S.W.3d 
48 (Ark. 2003) (citing France v. Nelson, 292 Ark. 219, 221, 729 S.W.2d 161, 163 (1987)). 
Only the results of a plurality decision are considered authoritative. See, e.g., Mark Alan 
Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court 
Plurality Opinions, 42 DUKE L. J. 419, 420–21 (1992). 
 138. See infra Part III.A.3(a). 
 139. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991). 
 140. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). 
 141. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). 
 142. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, at *1, 474 S.W.3d 65, 66. 
 143. Trial Tr., 690-691, July 2, 2014, Thacker, 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65 [hereinaf-
ter Transcript of Record]. 
 144. Transcript of Record, supra note 143, at 691. 
 145. Id. at 692. 
 146. Id. at 691. 
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bent over on top of the bed on all fours.147 The man began to penetrate Hil-
born digitally.148 He forced Hilborn to perform oral sex.149 The man stated, 
“I can’t believe I’m doing this. My DNA is all over this place.”150 Hilborn 
stated that the man had trouble maintaining an erection.151 The man pushed 
Hilborn into the bathroom and forced her to engage in anal intercourse.152 
When he stopped to reach for a lubricant, Hilborn jumped out of an open 
bathroom window, ran across the street to a neighbor’s house, and called 
911.153 
On the night of the incident, Hilborn told Officer Johnson that “she 
could not see very well but could tell her attacker was a white male, but was 
unsure of any other physical description.”154 At trial, Hilborn testified that 
“no man comes in my house . . . [t]here is no company in my house. It’s just 
me and my daughter. We do not have anyone else that come (sic) into my 
home. I do not have any platonic guy friends. No, that—that’s it.”155 She 
testified that she was in the early stages of dating a man, but that they 
“hadn’t even been intimate.”156 
Police found Thacker’s wallet in Hilborn’s bedroom.157 When asked 
who Jonathan Thacker was, Hilborn stated that she “didn’t have any earthly 
idea who it was.”158 Police showed Hilborn Thacker’s driver’s license pho-
tograph on the night of the incident, but she did not recognize him.159 It was 
not until after a local media outlet displayed the same photo of Thacker and 
labeled him as a person of interest in the rape that Hilborn told the police 
that Thacker was the man that raped her.160 The state asked Hilborn if she 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 691. 
 149. Id. at 693. 
 150. Transcript of Record, supra note 143, at 694. 
 151. Id. at 695. 
 152. Id. at 696–98. 
 153. Id. at 699–701. 
 154. Id. at 691. 
 155. Id. at 707. 
 156. Transcript of Record, supra note 143, at 711 (“[j]ust flirting with each there (sic), 
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 157. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, at *2, 474 S.W.3d 65, 66. 
 158. Transcript of Record, supra note 143, at 287–311. 
 159. Id. at 286–87. 
 160. Id. at 297 (“That’s when Channel 4 News was there and they showed me his picture. 
And from the minute they showed me his picture, I immediately recognized him from the 
bathroom. It’s like when you guys showed it to me at first . . . I didn’t.”). Indeed, this case 
garnered significant attention from the media from the time it was first reported to police 
until the Arkansas Supreme Court released this opinion. See Megan Reynolds, Police Seeking 
Man in Connection with Friday Morning Rape, THE CABIN (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://thecabin.net/news/local.2012-09-17/police-seeking-man-connection-friday-morning-
rape?page=3 (displaying Thacker’s driver’s license photograph); Megan Reynolds, Police 
Arrest Suspect in Rape Case, THE CABIN (Sept. 18, 2012), http://thecabin.net/news/
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believed that the defendant ejaculated that night, and she answered, “I do 
not believe he did.”161 Gary Eoff, Hilborn’s neighbor, saw a man exit Hil-
born’s house moments after she escaped.162 Eoff originally described the 
man as being 5’5” with blondish hair.163 Eoff originally identified the man 
who exited Hilborn’s house as one of his co-workers, someone other than 
Thacker, but then changed his statement after the media released Thacker’s 
information.164 
The state’s expert witness on forensic serology testified that numerous 
items were tested, and it was not abnormal for DNA to not be present.165 The 
defense was only permitted to elicit testimony that the defendant’s DNA 
was not present at the crime scene but was not permitted to introduce evi-
dence that another person’s semen was found on the victim’s bed sheets and 
pillow case.166 
2.  The Procedural History of Thacker v. State Silenced All Pillow 
Talk 
Early on, the state filed a motion to compel the defendant’s DNA sam-
ple to test the semen stains found on the victim’s bedsheets and pillow-
case.167 Pursuant to Brady,168 the state turned over the Arkansas State Crime 
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 166. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, at *1, 474 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Wynne, J., dissenting). 
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Lab results that excluded Thacker as the source of semen found on the vic-
tim’s bed sheets and pillowcase.169 
Thacker filed a motion in limine to admit the DNA evidence of semen 
on the victim’s bedsheet.170 The court denied the motion.171 Days before 
trial, the state tested an additional semen sample on a pillowcase and deter-
mined it did not contain Thacker’s DNA.172 The state filed a motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of this semen.173 Thacker orally amended his 
prior motion to include the DNA found on the pillowcase, arguing that the 
evidence was relevant to his defense theory of misidentification because it 
could lead the jury to conclude someone else committed the rape.174 The 
court granted the state’s motion and denied Thacker’s motion to admit the 
DNA evidence, only permitting the defense to make reference to the fact 
that his DNA was not located on any items the police submitted to testing.175 
Thacker’s sole issue on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court was 
“whether the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of DNA from semen 
samples found on the victim’s bedsheet and pillow that were inconsistent 
with his DNA.”176 On appeal, the defendant argued (1) that the evidence of 
another person’s semen on the sheets and pillowcase that were on the bed 
during the incident was relevant because it makes it more probable that 
someone other than him was the rapist and (2) that the semen’s probative 
value—evidence of an alternative rapist—outweighs any embarrassment or 
humiliation that the victim will suffer.177 
The state argued that the evidence has minimal probative value because 
the testimony at trial was that the defendant was the rapist.178 The state also 
argued that the semen found in the bedroom is not probative because there is 
nothing in the record to support an argument that the assailant left semen in 
the bedroom and that the prejudicial effect would require the victim to testi-
fy about her prior sexual history to explain the semen left by someone other 
than Thacker.179 
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3. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Analysis in Thacker v. State Was 
Splintered 
The Arkansas Supreme Court had a difficult time determining how far 
the courts should go in protecting victims from the potential embarrassment 
and humiliation of delving into their prior sexual history versus protecting 
criminal defendants’ constitutional rights to present a defense and to con-
front witnesses against them. The struggle is made evident by a plurality 
opinion based on a faulty grasp of the trial court record, the concurrence’s 
unwarranted procedural concerns, and a strongly worded dissent. 
a. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Plurality Opinion in Thacker 
v. State Is Incorrect and Should Not Be Afforded Any Defer-
ence 
Justice Rhonda Wood, unconvinced that the probative value of evi-
dence of another person’s semen on the victim’s bed outweighed the preju-
dicial effect, declared that the plurality could not say that it was clear error 
or a manifest abuse of discretion for the circuit court to exclude it.180 
First, the plurality found that Thacker failed to show a link between the 
semen samples found on the victim’s bed sheets and the charges of burglary 
and rape.181 Because the victim testified that the rapist “had difficulty ob-
taining, and was unable to maintain, an erection and did not ejaculate,” the 
plurality found it “unlikely that the rapist left semen on the bed sheet or pil-
lowcase.”182 Finding that it was unlikely that the rapist left semen, the plu-
rality held that the semen samples were not probative to Thacker’s defense 
of misidentification.183 The plurality stated that evidence of another person’s 
semen at the crime scene would insinuate that the victim had consensual 
sexual intercourse with someone other than the defendant prior to the inci-
dent, which falls within the policy justifications for excluding the evi-
dence.184 
Second, the plurality found that the prejudicial effect of the victim’s 
prior sexual history is great when compared to the probative value because, 
if admitted, the presentation of the semen would not be limited to a few 
questions.185 It would require the victim to explain her prior sexual history. 
The plurality concluded that the impact of the evidence on the victim and 
the perceived inappropriate character evidence outweighed “the slight pro-
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bative value of the evidence.”186 The plurality held that the trial court did not 
commit a manifest abuse of discretion when it denied Thacker the oppor-
tunity to present evidence of another person’s semen at the crime scene.187 
Although Thacker is a plurality opinion not entitled to any precedential 
weight,188 a lower court may afford it deference because it is the only Ar-
kansas Supreme Court case applying Arkansas’s rape shield statute to ex-
clude DNA evidence excluding the defendant as the source of semen. If a 
future Arkansas trial court is faced with a factually similar case and decides 
to apply Thacker, the court would likely follow the plurality’s analysis as 
persuasive. The trial court would center its analysis on whether the defend-
ant showed a link between the DNA evidence in the form of semen samples 
and the crime charged and whether that relevant evidence is unduly prejudi-
cial.189 The trial court would likely conduct a fact-centered inquiry like the 
Arkansas Supreme Court conducted in Thacker.190 In Thacker, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court underscored the alleged victim’s testimony that the rapist 
“had difficulty obtaining, and was unable to maintain, an erection and did 
not ejaculate.”191 Writing for the plurality, Justice Rhonda Wood found that 
it was “unlikely that the rapist left semen on the bed sheet or pillowcase.”192 
That is a very fact-driven analysis that lends itself to a great amount of judi-
cial discretion and leaps in analysis. 
If a trial court found that there was a link between the DNA evidence 
and the crime charged, the trial court would likely conduct an inquiry 
weighing the probative value of the evidence versus any unfair prejudice.193 
The trial court would likely place significant weight on factors, such as 
whether admission would require the victim to explain her prior sexual his-
tory, the potential humiliation and embarrassment to the victim, and the 
danger of unfairly prejudicing her character before the jury.194 
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In Thacker, the plurality placed significant weight on whether question-
ing regarding the evidence would require the alleged victim to testify in de-
tail about her prior sexual history and whether doing so would subject her to 
embarrassment or harassment concerning her sexual history.195 
The plurality mischaracterized the facts and took many leaps in logic to 
conclude that the evidence was not relevant. First, the plurality states that 
the alleged victim testified that the rapist “had difficulty obtaining, and was 
unable to maintain, an erection and did not ejaculate;” thus, the plurality 
found it “unlikely that the rapist left semen on the bed sheet or pillow-
case.”196 This statement glosses over the testimony and stands in stark con-
trast to the alleged victim’s trial testimony. Hilborn testified that the assail-
ant had an erection on the night of the alleged rape.197 At trial, the state 
asked Hilborn if she believed that the assailant ejaculated that night, and she 
answered, “I do not believe he did.”198 
Whether or not the alleged victim believes that the rapist ejaculated is 
irrelevant; the correct inquiry is whether there was a reasonable probability 
that the rapist left behind any sperm or semen.199 Here, there was a reasona-
ble probability that the rapist left behind sperm or semen. The victim testi-
fied that the rapist obtained an erection, forced her to perform oral, vaginal, 
and anal sex, moving from one room to another.200 Thus, there is a reasona-
ble probability that the rapist left behind sperm or semen because the rapist 
had an erection and forced the victim to engage in oral, vaginal, and anal 
intercourse.201 
The high probative value of this evidence outweighs any prejudicial ef-
fect of admitting evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct that would 
require the victim to explain her prior sexual history and any potential hu-
miliation and embarrassment to the victim.202 Semen stains on the victim’s 
bedsheets and pillowcase, where the rape occurred, are highly probative 
because they establish that the defendant was excluded as the source of se-
men at the crime scene, which bolsters his defense of misidentification.203 
DNA evidence itself is not inflammatory because it does not have the 
tendency to arise anger, animosity, or indignation.204 Certainly, if Thacker 
sought to admit evidence of another person’s semen to show that the victim 
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was promiscuous to cast doubt on her credibility, the rape shield statute 
would bar admission of that evidence.205 The record is clear; that was simply 
not the case. Thacker did not seek to admit evidence of another person’s 
semen to show that the victim was promiscuous or to cast doubt on whether 
she was raped; rather, Thacker sought to admit the evidence of another per-
son’s semen found on the bed sheets and pillow case where the rape oc-
curred to show that his semen did not match semen found at the crime scene 
that the state purported to be evidence of the assailant’s identity in its own 
motion to compel Thacker’s DNA sample.206 
Admission of the exculpatory DNA test result that conclusively elimi-
nates the defendant as the source of semen does not require the victim to 
testify about any prior sexual history.207 The purpose for admitting the evi-
dence was not to call into question the sexual behaviors and practices of the 
victim in an effort to paint a scarlet letter on her.208 The defense’s sole pur-
pose for admitting the DNA test that conclusively excluded him as the 
source of semen was to show that he was misidentified and that he was not 
the perpetrator of this offense.209 
Exclusion of the DNA evidence that has a high probability of exculpat-
ing the defendant was a violation of Thacker’s constitutional rights to pre-
sent a defense, to confront the witnesses against him, and to present evi-
dence that is crucial to his defense.210 The Arkansas Supreme Court failed to 
conduct the proper constitutional inquiry in Thacker because it did not ana-
lyze whether exclusion of the DNA evidence excluding the defendant as the 
source of semen violated the defendant’s constitutional rights and, if so, 
whether the exclusion was harmless.211 The Arkansas Supreme Court failed 
to accord proper weight to Thacker’s Sixth Amendment right “to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him,” which is incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment and is available in state court proceedings.212 The Su-
preme Court noted in Olden that the defendant’s constitutional right to con-
front witnesses against him includes the right to conduct reasonable cross-
examination.213 
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b.  The Concurring Opinion’s Procedural Concerns Are Mis-
placed and Attempts to Place an Unconstitutionally Burden-
some Weight on Criminal Defendants 
The thrust of the concurring opinion, written by Justice Karen R. Baker 
and joined by Justice Josephine L. Hart, was that the defense did not make a 
proper proffer of the DNA evidence that excluded the defendant as the 
source of semen.214 The concurrence pointed out that “[a] careful review of 
the record demonstrates that Thacker presented arguments solely of counsel. 
Simply put, Thacker did not proffer any evidence or offer any witness testi-
mony [concerning the DNA test he now contends the circuit court errone-
ously refused to admit].”215 
The concurrence’s concern is misplaced because the defense made a 
proper proffer to admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct under 
Arkansas’s rape shield statute.216 The record shows that both the defense and 
the state filed respective written motions in limine prior to trial.217 The rec-
ord reflects that those motions were argued at an in camera hearing well 
before trial.218 The trial court denied the defense’s motion in limine to admit 
evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct in the form of an Arkansas 
State Crime Laboratory Report excluding the defendant as the source of 
semen collected from the victim’s bedsheets.219 
The concurrence also takes issue with the probative value of the semen 
found on the victim’s bedsheets that excludes the defendant.220 The concur-
rence stated that evidence of another man’s semen on the bed sheets would 
only be relevant if the defendant had presented evidence of the timeframe of 
the semen deposits on the bed.221 
The concurrence is incorrect. Arkansas’s Rules of Evidence provide 
that even relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”222 In evaluating 
whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice so as to warrant exclusion of the evidence, the critical in-
quiry is “the degree of unfairness of prejudicial evidence and whether it 
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tends to support a decision on an improper basis.”223 The fact that evidence 
is harmful or prejudicial to a party is not a reason to exclude the evidence.224 
The purpose for which the defendant sought to admit the DNA evi-
dence was only to demonstrate that he is not a match to the semen collected 
on the victim’s bedsheets immediately after the crime.225 Counsel for de-
fendant outlined that purpose for which the defendant sought to introduce 
the evidence to showing that the defendant’s DNA did not match the semen 
found on the victim’s bedsheets immediately following the rape.226 
The concurrence sought to require the defendant to put on evidence 
showing the timeframe of the semen deposit on the victim’s bedsheets for 
evidence of another person’s semen to be relevant.227 Arkansas State Crime 
Laboratory Executive Director, Kermit B. Channell II, stated that it is im-
possible to “apply a specific date to when a semen stain was deposited.”228 
Thus, the concurrence seeks to require criminal defendants to make a proffer 
that is scientifically impossible in an effort to establish that potentially ex-
culpatory evidence is relevant to their defense.229 Such a blanket requirement 
places a scientifically impossible burden on the defendant in violation of his 
constitutional right to present a defense and to confront the evidence against 
him in violation of Davis230 and Olden.231 The concurring opinion’s proce-
dural concerns are misplaced, and its probative value analysis is incorrect. 
c.  The Dissenting Opinion Reached the Correct Conclusion, but 
Its Analysis Needs Polishing 
The conclusion reached by the dissenting opinion, written by Justice 
Robin F. Wynne and joined by Justice Paul E. Danielson, is correct, but its 
analysis needs to be refined. The dissent begins by pointing out that evi-
dence of semen on the victim’s bedsheets and pillowcase belonging to 
someone other than the defendant only falls under the rape shield statute if it 
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belongs to someone other than the rapist because the rape shield statute only 
protects evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim.232 
Here, the dissent correctly points out whether or not that semen be-
longed to the rapist was the single fact in dispute at trial.233 The defense 
sought to admit the evidence to show that the semen belonged to the real 
perpetrator and that he was simply misidentified.234 The state sought to ex-
clude the evidence because it believed that the semen was evidence of a 
prior sexual encounter of the victim, which should be excluded pursuant to 
rape shield.235 
The dissent concluded that the evidence of another person’s semen on 
the victim’s bedsheets collected immediately after the rape was relevant to 
the defendant’s defense of misidentification.236 The evidence of another per-
son’s semen was relevant to a fact at issue, namely the identity of the person 
who raped the victim, and evidence of another person’s semen is potentially 
exculpatory for the defendant.237 This is particularly true in light of other 
ample evidence supporting the defendant’s defense of misidentification, 
including the discrepancies between two major eye-witnesses, the victim 
and the neighbor, and the lack of any DNA evidence linking the defendant 
to the crime.238 
The dissent astutely noted that the state elicited testimony from its 
DNA experts regarding why DNA might not be found at the crime scene, 
implying that no DNA was found at the crime scene.239 The dissent was crit-
ical of the trial court permitting the state to leave the jury with the false im-
pression that there was no DNA evidence found at the crime scene, which 
was exacerbated by the trial court barring the defendant from confronting 
that theory with the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory Report that excluded 
the defendant as the source of semen found on the victim’s bed sheets and 
pillow case.240 
The dissent reached the correct conclusion that the trial court commit-
ted clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion,241 but failed to conduct the 
appropriate Lucas,242 Olden,243 and Van Arsdall244 analyses to conclude that 
the state’s rape shield statute was unconstitutional as applied. 
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B. Trial Courts Should Apply the Correct Analytical Framework to Admit 
the Pillow Talk into Evidence 
Had the Arkansas Supreme Court conducted the appropriate inquiry, it 
would have begun with the Lucas v. Michigan analysis.245 Lucas establishes 
that evidence that would otherwise violate the defendant’s constitutional 
rights may be excluded when it shows only a half-truth to the jury.246 Here, 
Thacker sought to admit evidence of another person’s semen found at the 
crime scene, which would show the whole picture of the incident. As the 
dissent points out, the trial court permitted the state to present a partial truth 
to the jury by leaving the jury with the false impression that no DNA evi-
dence was found at the crime scene and that was not unusual.247 By exclud-
ing the DNA evidence that excludes Thacker as the source of semen pursu-
ant to the rape shield statute, the trial court violated his constitutional rights 
to confront this evidence and to present a full defense.248 
The next step of the analysis is to analyze the case under Olden.249 Old-
en establishes that trial courts must analyze whether judicial discretion to 
impose reasonable limits on the probative value of defense evidence must 
bow its knee to the constitutional rights of the defendant.250 The correct 
analysis is to apply the Van Arsdall factors.251 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
should have weighed the factors set forth by the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,252 to consider whether denying Thack-
er the right to cross examine the DNA expert on the exculpatory DNA test 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.253 
First, the Arkansas Supreme Court should have fully appreciated the 
damaging potential of denying cross-examination of the state’s expert wit-
ness concerning the DNA test result.254 Second, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court should have weighed: (1) the importance of the witness’s testimony to 
the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) the 
presence or absence of material testimony corroborating or contradicting the 
testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of cross-
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examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the prose-
cution’s case.255 
The most pertinent factors for this case are the extent to which judicial 
restriction of other cross-examination is permitted and the overall strength 
of the prosecution’s case.256 The prosecution had a weak case against Thack-
er because both the victim and the eyewitness gave prior inconsistent state-
ments regarding the rapist’s description. Both originally described the rapist 
as being 5’5” tall with blonde hair, but Thacker stood 6’0” with black 
hair.257 The only link between the defendant and the victim was that his wal-
let was found in the victim’s house.258 The victim and eyewitness could not 
identify the defendant until the media displayed his driver’s license infor-
mation on local news stations.259 
The prosecution’s case was built on weak circumstantial evidence and 
confidence in the judge strictly applying the state’s rape shield statute 
against the defendant to prevent him from challenging the state’s weak cir-
cumstantial case.260 The only way to defend a case where the defendant 
claims misidentification is by heavy cross-examination of the witnesses 
against him.261 Denying Thacker the opportunity to question the witnesses 
against him on facts that are relevant and crucial to his defense of misidenti-
fication is unduly prejudicial and violates his constitutional rights to present 
a defense, to confront the witnesses against him, and to present evidence 
that is crucial to his defense.262 
The trial court committed clear error or an abuse of discretion by plac-
ing improper weight on whether the victim may be harassed or embarrassed 
or whether the evidence would only be “marginally relevant.”263 The trial 
court did not have the discretion to limit Thacker’s constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against him based on marginal relevance or harass-
ment, and those limitations should have bowed their knees to Thacker’s 
constitutional rights.264 
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Had the Arkansas Supreme Court conducted the relevant inquiry under 
Lucas,265 Olden,266 and Van Arsdall,267 the Arkansas Supreme Court would 
have given due consideration to Thacker’s constitutional rights to present a 
defense and to confront the witnesses against him. When Arkansas trial 
courts are faced with a factually similar case of whether to admit evidence 
of another person’s semen found at the crime scene pursuant to the rape 
shield statute, the trial court should conduct the relevant inquiry of Lucas,268 
Olden,269 and Van Arsdall.270 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Thacker v. State,271 the Arkansas Supreme Court failed to consider 
Thacker’s Sixth Amendment argument that excluding evidence of another 
person’s semen when the defense argues misidentification is a violation of 
his rights to present a defense and to confront witnesses against him.272 
When a future defendant’s DNA is excluded as the source of semen at the 
scene of a rape, the trial court should be cautious not to afford Thacker v. 
State273 precedential value. The trial court should apply the tests established 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lucas,274 Olden,275 and Van 
Arsdall276 to admit the pillow talk into evidence for it to be evaluated by the 
jury. 
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